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Manos Perakis, 
ΤΟ ΤΈΛΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΘΩΜΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΗΤΗΣ. ΟΙ ΟΡΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΡΡΈΥΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ 
ΚΑΘΈΣΤΩΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΧΑΛΈΠΑΣ, 1878-1889 [The end of Ottoman Crete: 
the circumstances of the collapse of the Halepa regime, 1878-1889], 
Athens: Vivliorama, 2008, 447 pages.1
Crete is first and foremost a representative Mediterranean paradigm, 
in the Braudelian sense, with crop cultivation characterized by variety, 
complementarity, and intensity in the exploitation of land, as was the case 
in the entire Mediterranean region, with agricultural products that sustained 
the income and the nourishment of its population. The economic parameters 
described and analyzed generally in the Mediterranean region focus primarily 
on cultivation, trade, piracy and migration. Cyprus and Sicily are indicative 
examples of large Mediterranean islands that offer comparable economic and 
social characteristics and dimensions to those of Crete. Large islands that 
grow crops primarily for the purpose of nourishment and clothing, these 
same islands have also created local urban élites.
Manos Perakis comprehends well the agricultural production of Crete 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, and he chooses in his 
book to address the political and social conditions of the Halepa era, which 
characterized the island’s economic life in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. The analysis contributes material and perspectives and evolves 
around a central issue of Greece’s modern history, the history of the large 
and self-sustained island of Crete, with a rich agricultural production (olive 
oil, wheat) and an important geo-strategic position in the Mediterranean 
from Antiquity to the present. Within the conventional dates of book’s title 
(1878-1889), Perakis identifies the Halepa era as perhaps having begun in 1868 
with the Organic Law and coming to a conclusion in 1898 with the end of the 
Ottoman administration and the departure of Ottoman troops.2
1 This text was presented at the meeting on late Ottoman Crete on the occasion of 
the publication of the book, organized by the Society of Cretan Historical Studies and 
the Eleftherios K. Venizelos National Research Foundation and held at the Historical 
Museum of Crete (Heraklion, 29 April 2009).
2 S. Kuneralp, The Final Stage of the Cretan Question, 1899-1913, Istanbul: Isis, 2009.
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The book is distinguished first of all for its analytical approach to the sources, 
since it draws fully on the local and, in part, consular archival collections 
with methodical meticulousness. This approach is apparent throughout, 
as well as in the section that is usually regarded the most joyless – namely, 
the appendices. There one will find included in full the main provisions of 
the Halepa Convention, and what I consider exceptionally interesting and 
useful: the names of the governors-general [γενικοί διοικητές] of the island, 
none of them Cretans, as well as those of the Cretan representatives for the 
period 1879-1889. The frequency of family names in the local councils and 
the Cretan National Assembly by year attests to the prominent position that 
a number of families enjoyed. For example, the Kondylakis family, which 
counted among its members the well-known writer and journalist Ioannis, 
appears to have steadily held onto the one Christian seat for the eparchy 
of Viannou in the Assembly for the entire decade. Likewise, Eleftherios 
Venizelos, the future prime minister of Greece, was elected plenipotentiary 
for the eparchy of Kydonias in 1889, while his brother-in-law, the lawyer 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, had held the same seat in 1879 and 1880. Crucially, 
the prominence of these Cretan “political” families coincided with the 
evolution of parliamentary institutions and the reconfiguration of economic 
patterns on mainland Greece.
The historical given in the post-Tanzimat period (1839-1876) is the persistent 
weakening of the administrative model of the Ottoman Empire, a process 
which had already begun before the Berlin Congress of 1878. This decline 
was particularly evident at the periphery of the empire, as in the case of 
the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, and the 
intensification of tendencies towards self-rule in particular island regions, 
such as Samos and Crete. An immediate foreign policy issue regarding 
Crete in this period, and specifically after the Berlin Congress of 1878, was 
the expansion and strengthening of the British Empire into the Eastern 
Mediterranean in competition with Russia and Austro-Hungary. 
The political issue at stake during the entire period preceding the Halepa 
Convention was the unification of Crete with Greece. The convention, which 
effectively led to the self-governance of the island and later to its unification 
with the Greek state, provided specific privileges that can be summarized as 
follows: the appointment of a Christian governor-general; the establishment 
of a National Assembly; the creation of a Gendarmerie; and the granting of 
special taxation privileges. However imperfect such privileges as political 
rights were to the Cretans, and as imperfect as their functioning was at a 
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national level, they were nonetheless adequate enough for defining the 
national and political independence of the island in relation to Greece.
The island’s economy followed its own “fateful” entrapment in agricultural 
cultivation characterized by the methods and financing means typical of the 
old regime: small Christian properties and a lack of financial institutions. The 
production of soap, yarn and fabric had been bettered in the international 
markets and can only be characterized as complementary and marginal. For 
this reason, Perakis correctly emphasizes that “commerce, production and 
services played an important role only at a local level: mainly in the three 
large cities (Heraklion, Chania and Rethymnon)”, as happened also in other 
corresponding Mediterranean instances. 
On the other hand, the management of the island’s public finances had as 
its objective the maintenance also of the ethnic and religious equilibrium, 
since, after 1840, the equal proportion of Christians and Muslims on the 
island shifted in favour of the former, resulting in the progressive emigration 
of Turkish-Cretans to Asia Minor. Throughout the period, the immediate 
domestic issue was the handling of, what was now, a Muslim minority.
Crete’s hybrid system of governance bears similarities to that of Samos. The 
Samian State of 1830-1834 and, following that, the independent Principality 
of Samos (1834-1912) manifest points of comparison with the Halepa 
era’s supervised independence. Samos’ history of seasonal migration to 
neighbouring Asia Minor, for the purpose of supplementing agricultural 
income, and overseas migrations in periods of crisis are phenomena that have 
been observed in all Mediterranean agricultural regions. Samos’ economy was 
always oriented towards the agricultural countryside and commerce, while 
wine-making and leather-tanning were the main manufacturing activities 
from the nineteenth century, later accompanied by tobacco production. 
Samos remained a poor agricultural island, with a relatively large population 
density when compared to regions of mainland Greece. Although a few 
prosperous seaside urban towns did emerge under the cultural influence 
mainly of Smyrna, Istanbul and Alexandria, it had a deficit economy that 
often functioned within a system of economic and demographic exchanges at 
the limits of the balance of nature within the Aegean region with Asia Minor 
as its main axis.3
3 For a model of inter-Aegean movements from an anthropological perspective, cf. E. 
Papataxiarchis, “Male Mobility and Matrifocality in the Aegean Basin”, in Brothers and 
Others: Essays in Honour of John Peristiany, Athens: ΕΚΚΕ, 1995, pp. 219-239.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:12:47 |
Maria Christina Chatziioannou360
A significant difference lies in the time horizon, which in the case of Samos 
is nearly a century (82 years) compared to the one decade of the Cretan 
case. Still, the main differences arise, not from the differing historical extent 
of the hybrid system of government, but mainly from the geographic and 
demographic characteristics of the two islands. Perakis notes Samos’ small 
agricultural hinterland, which is apparent from the island’s taxation system, 
with its large proportion of indirect taxes in comparison to Crete and 
Cyprus. Samos, with an area of 470 square kilometres and roughly 54,000 
inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century, that is, 114 inhabitants per 
square kilometre, lived off of its complementary economic relationship with 
neighbouring Asia Minor, which lies at a distance of 1.5 to 12 kilometres away. 
The Cretan census of 1881, which Perakis discusses in some detail, recorded 
a total population of 279,165 across an area of 8247 square kilometres, that 
is, 33 inhabitants per square kilometre, an exceptionally sparse area, with 
no geographic alleviative outlet in times of crisis. The issue of the self-
sufficiency, as well as the geographic isolation of Crete, had already created 
serious problems in managing the structural crises of the local economy in 
the post-Byzantine period. 
An important parameter of comparison between the two islands of Crete 
and Samos is the exercise of power by the Orthodox Greco-Ottoman élite 
of Istanbul, beginning with the Photiadis family, who provided the first 
governor-general of Crete, Ioannis, the deputy Prince of Samos, Alexandros, 
and the Prince of Samos, Konstantinos. The last was succeeded by an 
emblematic political figure, Alexandros Karatheodoris (1833-1906), who 
remained in his post until 1894, departing under strong popular pressure 
and dissatisfaction.4 The following year, he was appointed governor-general 
of Crete (1895-1896). The question remains as to what degree Samos’ semi-
independent regime or the Halepa era shaped political institutions with 
bourgeois democracy as their model. Here, another new realm for research 
opens up, namely, the exercise of political power of a hybrid nature between 
European and Ottoman models in the island region of the Mediterranean, a 
policy shaped by the Orthodox Greco-Ottoman élite of Istanbul. 
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4 I. Vakirtzis, Ιστορία της Ηγεμονίας της Σάμου, 1834-1912 [Samos 1912] [History of 
the independent Principality of Samos, 1834-1912], GAK Samos, Athens 2006.
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